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1. Introduction 
In recent years, studies on the determinants of innovative behavior in Europe have 
been encouraged by the increasing availability of firm-level data through the European 
Community Innovation Survey (CIS). The emerging literature has focused on determi-
nants of innovation such as market structure, firm size, knowledge spillovers, R&D colla-
boration, conditions for the appropriation of innovation benefits, and others. This paper 
will address a factor that has not been covered in CIS studies: What is the influence of the 
increased flexibility of labor on innovation? 
Over the last twenty years, many labor market economists have strongly 
recommended that high unemployment should be reduced by making European labor 
markets more flexible. An example is the OECD's Jobs Study (1994). Subsequent to the 
Jobs Study, a literature has developed that tries to substantiate that more flexible labor 
markets would not only be favorable for employment, but may also allow for higher 
economic growth and higher productivity growth (e.g. Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2003). 
Nonetheless, flexible labor contracts as determinants of innovation or productivity growth 
are still under-researched. There are only few firm-level studies, including Laursen and 
Foss (2003), Michie and Sheehan (2003), Kleinknecht et al. (2006), Arvanitis (2005), and 
Lucidi and Kleinknecht (2009). This is regrettable, as labor relations and human resour-
ces have been suggested to have a significant impact on innovation through their influ-
ence on knowledge processes (Amabile et al., 1996; Guest, 1997; Trott, 1998). 
This study makes an empirical contribution to our sparse knowledge about the im-
pact of flexible labor on innovation using firm-level data from several subsequent surveys 
with broad industry coverage in the Netherlands. Our database covers a “direct” measure 
of innovation: sales performance of new or improved products, introduced during the past 
2 years. We take advantage of the fact that there is a wide spectrum of typical labor con-
tract patterns in the Netherlands (and in our database). A number of Dutch firms still have 
fairly rigid “Rhineland” labor relations, while others have highly flexible “Anglo-Saxon” 
practices in hiring. “Rhineland” firms typically offer their personnel good wages, fair 
protection against dismissal, and longer-term commitments. “Anglo-Saxon” firms em-
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ploy significant labor on fixed-term contracts, hired from employment agencies or free-
lance workers, which allows them to adapt to changing demand conditions by easily hi-
ring or firing people.1
We trust that the wide spectrum of “Rhineland” versus “Anglo-Saxon” labor con-
tracts in the Netherlands allows for a meaningful study of the possible impact of flexible 
labor on innovation performance. This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a 
brief sketch of the theoretical background and discusses our hypotheses. Section 3 des-
cribes our data and the empirical model. Section 4 reports the regression results. Section 
5 rounds up with conclusions. 
 
2. Patterns of flexible labor and innovation 
Labor market flexibility can be subdivided into three types of flexibility: (1) nume-
rical flexibility, (2) functional flexibility and (3) wage flexibility (e.g. Beatson, 1995). 
This paper is confined to analyzing numerical and functional flexibility. Numerical (or 
“external”) flexibility allows for easy hiring or firing of personnel, resulting in significant 
reductions of a firm's wage bill.2
Functional flexibility is the ability of firms to reallocate labor in their internal labor 
markets, relying on training that allows personnel to carry out a wider range of tasks (e.g. 
Beatson, 1995). Functional flexibility reflects the multiple competencies of workers, such 
as multi-skilling, multi-tasking, cooperation and the involvement of workers in decision 
making (Arvanitis, 2005). Functional (or “internal”) flexibility is characteristic of the 
“Rhineland” model of labor relations, providing opportunities for long-term careers in the 
same firm. Such long-term commitments may be interpreted as an investment in the trust, 
loyalty and commitment of individuals. 
 High numerical (or “external”) flexibility is at the core 
of the “Anglo-Saxon” model of labor relations. 
Many mainstream economists tend to be in favor of more flexible, “Anglo-Saxon” 
labor markets. In a traditional microeconomics view, markets can never be flexible 
enough. There are a number of detailed arguments in favor of more numerical flexibility. 
First, long tenured employees may become conservative, being attached to outdated pro-
ducts and processes, and reluctant to adapt to significant changes due to “lock-in” effects 
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(Ichniowski and Shaw, 1995). Second, labor market rigidity may reduce the reallocation 
process of labor from old and declining to newly emerging industries, and the difficulty 
of firing personnel might frustrate labor-saving process innovations (Bassanini and Ernst, 
2002; Scarpetta and Tessel 2004; see also Nickell and Layard, 1999). Third, with strong 
protection against dismissal, labor may become too powerful, increasing the chance that 
monopoly profits from innovation will be (partly) absorbed through higher wage claims. 
Monopoly profits from innovation are a reward for taking innovative risks; such risk-ta-
king would be discouraged if labor could claim part of the premium. Powerful labor, 
negotiating wage contracts at the firm level, could therefore “hold up” investments in 
innovation (Malcomson, 1997). Finally, one might add that higher flexibility would also 
allow for easier replacement of less productive personnel by more productive people and 
the threat of firing might prevent shirking. Easier hiring and firing could also help keep 
wages low, as is evidenced by estimates of wage equations.3
As counterarguments against high numerical flexibility, we propose the following: 
high numerical flexibility may weaken a firm's historical memory and continuity of lear-
ning. A high external labor turnover rate may reduce employees' loyalty and commit-
ment, resulting in easier leakage of knowledge to competitors; such externalities would 
discourage investment in R&D. The argument that high numerical flexibility will make it 
difficult for firms to store innovative knowledge is particularly relevant for firms that 
have a “routinized” Schumpeter II innovation regime (Kleinknecht et al., 2006). In a 
Schumpeter II regime, the path-dependent historical accumulation of knowledge is criti-
cal to superior product and process performance. Much of the accumulated knowledge is 
“tacit.” Different from documented and codified knowledge, “tacit” knowledge is ill-
documented and idiosyncratic, as it is based on personal experience (Polanyi, 1966). 
Accumulation of such knowledge is favored by a longer tenure in the same firm. 
 Moreover, as has recently 
been emphasized by Arvanitis (2005), firms can more effectively fulfill their demands for 
specialized services by making use of temporary work. 
Shorter job durations may also discourage investments in firm-sponsored training. 
In highly flexible labor markets, employees may be interested in acquiring general know-
ledge that increases their employability elsewhere, but they may be reluctant to acquire 
firm-specific knowledge (e.g., studying safety instructions) if they anticipate a short stay 
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in the firm. Moreover, Naastepad and Storm (2006) have shown that (growing) flexibility 
in labor relations in OECD countries leads to a significant growth in management bureau-
cracies to control disloyal behavior. While adherents of flexible labor markets emphasize 
that difficult firing of redundant personnel would frustrate labor-saving innovations, it 
can also been argued that personnel who are easy to fire have strong incentives to hide in-
formation about how their work can be done more efficiently. This can be damaging to 
productivity growth as far as the management is dependent on their personnel's “tacit” 
knowledge to efficiently implement process innovations (see also Lorenz, 1999). Finally, 
easy firing may change power relations in a firm. Personnel on the shop floor are less 
likely to criticize powerful (top) managers, and poor critical feedback from the shop floor 
may favor problematic management practices. 
Given the opposing theoretical arguments pertaining to numerical flexibility, it is 
interesting to look at empirical findings. Two recent studies using UK firm-level data 
show a negative correlation between numerical flexibility and innovation (Michie and 
Sheehan, 1999, 2001). Similar results are reported by Chadwick and Cappelli (2002) 
from US data. Arvanitis (2005) reports mixed results. In one of his specifications, he 
finds that temporary work has a positive impact on innovation, which he ascribes to the 
need to hire specialists on a temporary basis for the R&D process. When using part-time 
work as another indicator of flexible labor, he finds a significantly negative impact on 
innovation. His general conclusion is that "… firms with high productivity are those 
which apply new forms of workplace organization but do not engage many part-time and 
temporary workers" (Arvanitis, 2005: 1010). Given that the results by Arvanitis are not 
clear-cut, we shall also test whether there is a non-linear relationship, using quadratic 
terms of numerically flexible labor. 
While the impact on innovation of numerical flexibility is doubtful, Arvanitis does 
find a positive impact on productivity and innovation for several of his indicators of 
functional flexibility. Similar results have been found by others (Michie and Sheehan, 
1999, 2001; Chadwick and Cappelli, 2002; Kleinknecht et al., 2006). High functional 
flexibility in internal labor markets reflects a firm's ability to organize flexibly without 
destroying loyalty and commitment by firing. This is likely to reduce positive externali-
ties through the exit of trained people or through disloyal behavior (e.g., the leaking of 
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trade secrets to competitors). Furthermore, high functional flexibility can reduce commu-
nication barriers between different departments. Better sharing and transfer of knowledge 
across departments can favor innovation. 
3. Data, variables and methodology 
We use longitudinal firm-level data collected by the Organization for Strategic La-
bor Market Research (OSA) in the Netherlands. Since 1988, OSA has built an enterprise 
panel in all sectors of manufacturing, services, agriculture and in non-commercial servi-
ces, including the government sector. In fact, OSA samples all organizations in the 
Netherlands that employ personnel, with a minimum of five people, stratified by indu-
stries and firm size classes. The database provides information about the labor force (e.g., 
inflow, outflow, type of contract, internal mobility), as well as about R&D and new pro-
ducts sales. Since 1989, the survey has been conducted every two years. Organizations 
taking part in a previous survey are also included in the next survey. New organizations 
are added to each wave in order to compensate for sample fall-out (see Appendix A). 
Data collection is performed using a combination of questionnaire-based face-to-face 
interviews and a questionnaire to be filled in by a manager and returned by mail. 
We construct a longitudinal dataset that includes dependent variables in year t and 
lagged independent variables in year t-2, the latter coming from the previous survey. Our 
final dataset is confined to the period 1992-2000, as information from earlier surveys is 
not fully comparable. Furthermore, we estimate our models on the total sample as well as 
on a sub-sample of 929 commercial SMEs with less than 250 employees. Restriction to 
SMEs has the advantage of having a more homogeneous sample. We confine our sample 
to four business sectors, i.e., manufacturing (SBI 15- SBI 37), construction (SBI 45), 
trade (SBI 50-52) and (other) services (SBI 55, SBI 60-67, SBI 70-74, and SBI 77). We 
exclude government and other non-commercial organizations. 
Our database allows the use of a “direct” indicator of product innovation; i.e., sales 
of new (or significantly improved) products and/or services. It is similar to the “innova-
tion output” indicator in the CIS database. There are two deviations of the OSA question-
naire from the CIS concept as described in the OECD Oslo Manual (2005). First, the CIS 
asks for new or improved products introduced during the past three years, while OSA 
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covers the past two years. Second the CIS distinguishes products that are “new to the 
firm” from those that are “new to the market,” whereas OSA only asks for the former. 
We interpret products “new to the firm” as “imitative” innovations, and products “new to 
the market” as “true” innovations. As in the CIS, innovation performance in our OSA 
database is measured by asking respondents to subdivide their present product range into 
three types of product: 
(1) Products that remained largely unchanged during the past two years; 
(2) Products that were incrementally improved during the past two years; and 
(3) Products that were radically changed or introduced as entirely new products 
during the past two years. 
Subsequently, respondents are asked to report the share of these three types of pro-
duct in their last year's total sales. As our dependent variable, we use the logs of new pro-
duct sales per employee introduced during the past two years; when using logs, this vari-
able conforms better to a normal distribution. Constructing this variable, we add catego-
ries (2) and (3), i.e., incremental and radical innovations. One should note that the new 
product sales under (2) and (3) need to be novel in that they include new technological 
knowledge; at least, they should be based on novel (and creative) combinations of exis-
ting technological knowledge, the latter being most relevant in the service industries. As 
mentioned earlier, the data do not allow us to distinguish “imitative” innovations ("new to 
the firm") from “true” innovations ("new to the market"). Only the 2001 survey provides 
information on novelty. It comes as no surprise that only a smaller portion of the innova-
ting firms have products that are “new to the market'” (see Table 3-1). In other words, our 
indicator of new product sales is dominated by “imitative” innovations. We evaluate the 
slight evidence on “new to the market” innovations in a separate estimate. 
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Table 3-1 Degree of novelty of new products in OSA survey (only survey 2001) 
Firms declaring that their new products were: # of All firms (%) # of SMEs (%) 
'new to the market' 268 (15.7) 188 (14.6) 
'partially 903 (52.8)  new to the market' 655 (50.9) 
'hardly 540 (31.5)  new to the market' 445 (34.5) 
Totals 1,711 (100) 1,288 (100) 
 
Our most important independent variables are numerical flexibility and functional 
flexibility. We use two indicators of numerical flexibility: Annual external labor turnover 
(i.e., percentages of people that joined or left the firm during the last year) and percenta-
ges of people on fixed-term contracts (hired directly by the firm). The correlation tables 
in the appendix show that the two indicators are weakly correlated; fortunately, our ro-
bustness checks with the multivariate analyses below indicate that this is not disturbing. 
Annual external labor turnover is measured by the maximum value of either the share of 
newly hired people or the share of people that left the firm in the past year. We also made 
robustness checks, using, e.g., the sum of people that left or joined the firm. This changed 
our results very little. We expect both indicators of numerical flexibility to have positive 
impacts on innovation performance until an optimum point, thereafter turning negative. 
We try to capture such non-linear effects by the inclusion of quadratic terms. Our indica-
tor of functional (or “internal”) flexibility is measured by the percentage of employees 
that changed their function and/or department within the firm during the past year. We 
expect functional flexibility to have a positive impact on innovation performance. 
Control variables 
We use the following control variables, which are described in more detail in Ap-
pendix B: 
(1) Quality of human capital. This is measured by the percentage of employees with 
university or higher professional education degrees and by the percentage of employees 
who participated in training. Previous studies indicate that highly educated people can 
adapt more quickly to a changing environment, thus contributing to better business per-
formance (Holzer, 1987; Becker and Huselid, 1992; Galende and Suarez, 1999). Further-
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more, formal and informal training can enhance an employee’s development and is likely 
to contribute positively to organizational outcomes and innovation (Russell et al., 1985; 
Bartel, 1994; Knoke and Kalleberg, 1994; Laursen and Foss, 2003). We thus expect both 
of these variables to have positive impacts on innovation performance. 
(2) R&D intensity as a proxy of inputs to the innovative process. 
(3) The logarithm of firm size. The relationship between firm size and a firm's 
innovation performance is inconclusive. On the one hand, small firms have little 
bureaucracy, short communication lines and dedicated management by their owners. On 
the other hand, strong dependence on the owner as a key figure can also have 
disadvantages. Moreover, small firms often suffer from a lack of (financial) resources and 
access to technological knowledge (see Tidd et al., 2006). A major disadvantage of small 
firms is that they have little capability to reduce risks by means of a diversified portfolio 
of innovative projects. 
(4) The logarithm of firm age. The impact of firm age on innovation is again a two-
sided story. Young firms can be expected to have highly dedicated and flexible 
management and they can be more ambitious in innovation, as there is no internal 
resistance by vested interests in older product lines. Their innovation performance may, 
however, suffer from lack of experience with innovation (van de Panne et al., 2003). As 
far as innovative activities take advantage of accumulated technological knowledge and 
management experience from the past, firms with a long innovation history might use 
their R&D more efficiently. 
(5) Export intensity. The causal relationship between export and innovation is bi-
directional. First, innovation stimulates exports performance (Posner, 1961; Vernon, 
1966). Then, endogenous growth and new trade theories emphasize that export stimulates 
investment in R&D as operations on export markets give better access to international 
knowledge spillovers through flows of ideas and/or goods (Grossman and Helpman, 
1991; Aghion and Howitt, 1998). Hughes (1988) reports empirical evidence on the simul-
taneous relationship between export and R&D at sector level; evidence of a simultaneous 
relationship at the firm level has been reported by Kleinknecht and Oostendorp (2002). 
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Using export shares in total sales lagged by two years, we try to mitigate the endogeneity 
problem. 
(5) Industry average of new product sales. A firm's score on new product sales 
crucially depends on the typical length of the product life cycle in its sector of principal 
activity. Obviously, a sector like ICT with short product life cycles will have higher sales 
of new products than sectors with long life cycles, such as aircraft construction. The 
dependent variable can therefore not
 
 be compared across industries unless we correct for 
life cycle differences. As life cycle data are not easily collected in enterprise surveys, we 
use, as a substitute, the log of average new product sales in a firm's sector of principal 
activity. Inclusion of this variable comes down to explaining the deviation of a firm's new 
product sales from the average of its industry. Besides correcting for typical differences 
in product life cycles between industries, this variable can also capture other unobserved 
specifics of industries, such as differences in technological opportunity or in the appro-
priability of innovation benefits. Not surprisingly, inclusion of this variable made indu-
stry dummies insignificant. In our robustness checks, it turned out that a tentative ex-
change of this variable against industry dummies had little effect on the coefficients of 
the other variables. 
3.1. Econometric model 
We assume that flexible labor patterns are related to a firm's new product sales as 
follows: 
2,42,32,22,1, −−−− +++++= tittitititi YearsConFFLNFLy εββββα  Equation (1) 
Here, y (for firm i and year t) denotes the log of “new product sales per employee.” 
We include lagged values of the following independent variables: “NFL” includes 
variables of numerical flexibility measured by external labor turnover and percentages of 
people on temporary contract; “FFL” denotes functional flexibility, i.e., the percentages 
of employees changing function or department within firms; “Con” represents seven 
control variables; and “Years” represents year dummies. By using 2-year lagged values of 
independent variables, we reduce potential endogeneity problems. 
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We use four econometric models on pooled longitudinal data: an OLS model, a 
Tobit model, a Heckman model and a Heck-tobit model. We do not estimate panel data 
models because of high attrition. A balanced panel covering 5 waves of data would leave 
only very few firms. Rather than using one-way error component models or equally com-
plex methods for unbalanced panels (for a survey see Baltagi and Song, 2004), we use 
straightforward regression techniques on pooled longitudinal data, correcting for repeated 
observations (clustering) with robust estimation methods. 
First, we use a pooled OLS model (Model 1). This has the disadvantage of sample 
selection bias since it only includes firms that have positive innovation output. Firms with 
zero or missing innovation output are excluded (also because of the log transformation), 
with a possible sample selection bias as a result. In order to correct for selection bias, we 
have two options, and we use both. First, we use the Tobit model (Model 2). A Tobit mo-
del (e.g. Maddala, 1985) corrects for non-normality of the distribution of our dependent 
variable that is caused by the high probability mass at zero due to firms that have no new 
product sales. Including firms with no innovation reduces the sample selection bias. 
The mathematical representation of a simple Tobit procedure is as follows: 
0
0
   
0 ≤
>




= *
iy
*
iy
if
if*
iyiy   Equation (2) 
Where *iy  is a latent variable: ),0(~,
2* σβ iiii uuxy +=   Equation (3) 
Second, we use a Heckman model (Model 3) to correct for item non-response bias. 
The Heckman model also includes firms that did not report their innovation output, again 
reducing sample selection bias. In the Heckman model, a selection equation is introduced 
with a binary variable z (for firm i and year t), which indicates whether the dependent 
variable (y) is observed or not. The underlying continuous variable is modeled as follows: 
Heckman selection equation: 2,2,, −− += tititi uwz γ  , Equation (4) 
where w represents the independent variables listed in the linear equation (Equation 1) 
and an instrumental variable. We choose for the latter a variable that measures a firm's 
sensitivity to economic fluctuations. The latter does not correlate with the error terms in 
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the linear equation, but does have a significant impact on the propensity to innovate in the 
selection equation. This instrumental variable thus ensures the identification of the Heck-
man model (Heckman, 1979; Greene, 2002).  
Finally, we also use a Heck-tobit model (Model 4) to control for both aforemen-
tioned possible selection biases. We first formally test for sample selection bias using a 
Heckman two-step procedure and generate an inverse Mill's ratio (Heckman 1979; Berk, 
1983). This ratio captures the probability of responding to the survey as a function of the 
variables listed in w of equation 4. We then include this ratio in the Tobit model to statis-
tically control for item non-response bias. 
4. Results from four regression models 
Descriptive statistics are reported in Appendix C. Appendices D and E show the 
correlations between our independent variables in the total sample and the SME sample. 
No correlation exceeds 0.5. The variance inflation factors (VIFs) range from 1.03 to 1.21, 
from which we conclude that multicollinearity is unlikely to be a problem. Tables 4-1A 
and B present the results of four regression models in the total sample and in the SME 
sample. 
We explain the log of new product sales per employee achieved by firms that have 
such sales. In other words, our interpretation is strictly confined to innovating firms. The 
four regression models produce fairly consistent results. It is reassuring that the coeffi-
cients proved robust to tentative inclusion or exclusion of various independent variables. 
An important result in the earlier rounds of our estimates (not documented here) comes 
from experiments with quadratic terms of our variables on numerical flexibility. Their in-
clusion had little influence on the other coefficients, and, against our expectations, these 
quadratic terms proved insignificant throughout. They are therefore omitted from our fi-
nal version. 
Both tables show that, as expected, R&D intensity is highly significantly positive in 
all four models. The positive effect of export intensity on innovation performance is also 
highly significant in all versions. It is no surprise that an individual firm's new product 
sales are heavily related to the average new product sales in its sector of principal acti-
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vity. Including industry average new product sales implies that our model explains devia-
tions of an individual firm's new product sales from its industry average. The two indica-
tors of human capital (educational achievements and training) have positive impacts on a 
firm’s innovation performance (significant at the 5% level in all four models). This re-
confirms the importance of qualified human capital to the innovation process. 
Pertaining to firm size and firm age, we conclude that the advantages and disadvan-
tages of a firm being small or big and being young or old seem almost to cancel each 
other out. We find only weak evidence (at the 10% level) that older and larger firms 
might have higher new product sales when considering the total sample (see Table 4-1A). 
When taking SMEs separately, however, the coefficients for size or age become insignifi-
cant (see Table 4-1B). 
As expected, high rates of individual changes in function or department within the 
firm (“functional flexibility”) contribute positively to new product sales, being significant 
at 5% level in all four models in both samples. This underlines the importance of “insi-
der-outsider” labor markets for keeping knowledge in the firm and investing in the loyal-
ty and commitment of employees while allowing for flexibility. 
Finally, all four models in both samples indicate that a high external labor turnover 
has no impact on innovation. In three out of four models, however, high shares of em-
ployees on temporary contract seem to have a positive impact on innovation output (sig-
nificant at the 5% level in the SME sample and at the 10% level in the total sample). This 
finding supports the argument by Ichniowski and Shaw (1995) discussed earlier, but is 
hard to reconcile with recent firm-level studies in the Netherlands (Kleinknecht et al., 
2006) and in Italy (Lucidi and Kleinknecht, 2009) that find a negative impact of 
numerically flexible labor on labor productivity growth. It is important to keep in mind 
that two studies using UK firm-level data also show a negative correlation between nu-
merical flexibility and innovation (Michie and Sheehan, 1999, 2001), and that similar re-
sults are reported by Chadwick and Cappelli (2002) from US data. As mentioned above, 
Arvanitis (2005) reports mixed results on the topic. 
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Table 4-1A: Explaining logs of new product sales per employee a (Summary of regressions from total sample) 
Dependent variable 
Log (new product sales per employee) 
Model 1 
OLS 
Model 2 
Tobit 
Model 3 
Heckman (linear part) 
Model 4 
Heck-tobit 
Labor flexibility: Coefficient (t-value) Coefficient (t-value) Coefficient (t-value) Coefficient (t-value) 
External labor turnover (max.) 0.004 (0.76) 0.007 (0.95) 0.005 (0.91) 0.014 (1.16) 
% of temporary work 0.039 (1.92)† 0.061 (2.03)* 0.037 (1.83)† 0.047 (1.29) 
Functional flexibility 0.063 (2.75)** 0.091 (2.68)** 0.064 (2.83)** 0.099 (2.74)** 
Control variables:     
Qualified personnel 0.026 (2.93)** 0.040 (2.97)** 0.025 (2.88)** 0.035 (2.29)* 
Training efforts 0.017 (2.24)* 0.026 (2.10)* 0.017 (2.26)* 0.026 (2.10)* 
Export intensity 0.020 (3.04)** 0.030 (3.05)** 0.020 (3.11)** 0.033 (3.02)** 
Firm age 0.012 (1.80)† 0.019 (1.88)† 0.012 (1.86)† 0.021 (2.01)* 
R&D intensity in new product/service 0.074 (5.71)** 0.119 (5.96)** 0.074 (5.71)** 0.118 (5.90)** 
Firm size 0.001 (1.71)† 0.001 (1.86)† 0.001 (1.54) 0.001 (0.56) 
Industry average new product sales 0.962 (3.09)** 1.411 (2.85)** 0.904 (2.86)** 0.948 (1.16) 
Year1997 b -7.423 (-3.40)** -11.042 (-3.17)** -6.993 (-3.14)** -7.603 (-1.28) 
Year1999 -7.080 (-3.25)** -10.499 (-3.03)** -6.773 (-3.09)** -8.044 (-1.65)† 
Year2001 -8.747 (-3.93)** -13.393 (-3.76)** -8.583 (-3.87)** -12.094 (-3.02)** 
Constant term 0.693 (0.53) -4.295 (-1.99)* 0.465 (0.35) -6.085 (-1.89)† 
Instrumental variable     
Nonselection hazard    4.729 (0.73) 
Economic fluctuations c   -0.096 (-2.48)* -0.094 (-2.53)* 
Number of observations 1032 1032 2329 1031 
Censored observations  395 1298 395 
Uncensored observations  637 1031 636 
Statistics summary 
 
 
R²  = 0.1354 Log likelihood = -
2561.5084 
Pseudo R² = 0.0272 
Wald chi2(13): 183.00 
Prob>chi2: 0.0000 
Wald test of independent 
equations (rho=0): 
chi2(1)=0.90 
Prob>chi2 = 0.3438 
Log likelihood = -
2562..3007 
Pseudo R² = 0.0257 
a † : at 0.1 significance level; *: at 0.05 significance level; **: at 0.01 significance level; two-tailed test 
b The reference group of year dummies is 1995 
c The coefficient of 'sensitivity to economic fluctuations' is in the selection equation of the Heckman model, not in the linear equation 
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 Table 4-1B: Explaining logs of new product sales per employee 
a (Summary of regression from SME sample) 
Dependent variable 
Log (new product sales per employee) 
Model 1 
OLS 
Model 2 
Tobit 
Model 3 
Heckman (linear part) 
Model 4 
Heck-tobit 
Labor flexibility: Coefficient (t-value) Coefficient (t-value) Coefficient (t-value) Coefficient (t-value) 
External labor turnover (max.) 0.007 (1.14) 0.012 (1.31) 0.008 (1.35) 0.023 (1.59) 
% of temporary work 0.045 (2.19)* 0.070 (2.30)* 0.042 (2.06)* 0.046 (1.15) 
Functional flexibility 0.062 (2.33)* 0.091 (2.22)* 0.062 (2.35)* 0.091 (2.21)* 
Control variables:     
Qualified personnel 0.026 (2.79)** 0.042 (2.86)** 0.026 (2.76)** 0.037 (2.38)* 
Training 0.019 (2.34)* 0.029 (2.22)* 0.020 (2.44)* 0.034 (2.43)* 
Export intensity 0.018 (2.38)* 0.027 (2.39)* 0.019 (2.52)* 0.036 (2.49)* 
Firm age 0.011 (1.52) 0.018 (1.60) 0.011 (1.59) 0.022 (1.83)† 
R&D intensity in new product/service 0.074 (5.38)** 0.122 (5.69)** 0.074 (5.37)** 0.122 (5.66)** 
Firm size 0.003 (0.95) 0.005 (0.99) 0.003 (0.84) 0.002 (0.28) 
Industry average new product sales 1.002 (2.99)** 1.574 (2.86)** 0.942 (2.80)** 1.058 (1.39) 
Year1997 b -8.062 (-3.43)** -12.767 (-3.31)** -7.608 (-3.23)** -8.904 (-1.61) 
Year1999 -7.522 (-3.21)** -11.880 (-3.10)** -7.248 (-3.10)** -9.562 (-2.12)* 
Year2001 -9.415 (-3.93)** -15.314 (-3.87)** -9.350 (-3.93)** -14.789 (-3.71)** 
Constant term 0.479 (0.34) -5.283 (-2.18)* 0.050 (0.03) -8.900 (-2.08)* 
Instrumental variable     
Nonselection hazard    7.386 (1.00) 
Economic fluctuations c   -0.097 (-2.34)* -0.093 (-2.35)* 
Number of observations 928 928 2044 927 
Censored observations  372 1117 372 
Uncensored observations  556 927 555 
Statistics summary 
 
 
R²  = 0.1348 Log likelihood = -
2266.7467 
Pseudo R² = 0.0279 
Wald chi2(14): 172.41 
Prob>chi2: 0.0000 
Wald test of 
independent equations 
(rho=0): chi2(1)=2.13 
Prob>chi2 = 0.1440 
Log likelihood = -
2263.0926 
Pseudo R² = 0.0281 
a † : at 0.1 significance level; *: at 0.05 significance level; **: at 0.01 significance level; two-tailed test 
b The reference group of year dummies is 1995 
c The coefficient of 'sensitivity to economic fluctuations' is in the selection equation of the Heckman model, not in the linear equation 
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Interpreting our finding of a positive impact of temporary contracts on new product 
sales, two caveats should be kept in mind. The first qualification shown in Table 4-2, is 
that the screening of personnel is an important motive for employing people on a fixed-
term basis. The motive of savings on the wage bill plays only a minor role (3.2%). More 
than 40% of the temporary contracts in the OSA database serve as a trial period, after 
which individuals may extend their employment with the firm. This indicates that firms 
are dependent on probationary periods to select the right personnel. In particular, recent 
university graduates typically begin their employment on a temporary basis. After a 
period of good performance, they can expect tenure. In this context, it is interesting to see 
a correlation between qualified personnel and temporary work (significant at the 5% le-
vel) in Appendices D and E. 
Table 4-2: Descriptive statistics: Reasons of using fixed term contracts a 
Reasons for fixed-term contracts: Total sample: SME sample: 
1. Fluctuations 217 (28.07%) 154 (27.11%) 
2. Cost purpose 25 (3.23%) 18 (3.17%) 
3. Personal preference of people 7 (0.91%) 6 (1.06%) 
4. Replacement because of illness / 
absence 
61 (7.89%) 49 (8.63%) 
5. (Extended) try-out period 330 (42.69%) 254 (44.72%) 
6. Seasonal peaks 17 (2.20%) 14 (2.46%) 
7. Temporarily off work 60 (7.76%) 40 (7.04%) 
8. Others 56 (7.24%) 33 (5.81%) 
a Source: OSA database; information available only in surveys 2001 and 1997 
 
As a second qualification, recall that our dependent variable is heavily influenced 
by products that are new to the firm, i.e., by “imitative” rather than “innovative” (“new to 
the market”) products. We cannot distinguish between “imitative” and “innovative” pro-
ducts, except in the survey administered in 2001, which includes a separate question 
about degrees of novelty. Table 3-1 showed that the majority of firms that introduce new 
products are market followers (or imitators) rather than market leaders: less than 16% of 
the firms have products that are fully “new to the market.” Using these data, we estimated 
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an ordered logit model in Table 4-3. The table shows three things: First, firms with high 
R&D intensities tend to have higher probabilities of introducing products that are “new to 
the market.” Second, the same holds for firms in industries with high shares of new pro-
ducts sales. Third, high percentages of workers on temporary contracts have a negative 
impact on the probability that a firm's new products will be “new to the market.” Similar 
results hold when we confine the sample to firms with less than 250 workers (not docu-
mented here). The finding in Table 4-3 is opposed to the positive coefficient of temporary 
contracts in our estimate in Table 4-1. It appears that the arguments in favor of rigid labor 
relations mainly hold for the market leaders that undertake substantial R&D efforts. For 
the larger stream of imitators, more flexible labor relations are more attractive. 
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Table 4-3: What factors determine whether a product will be new to the market rather 
than new to the firm? a (Summary of Ordered logistic regressions, total sample) 
The dependent variable is: Novelty of innovative products 
(1 = new to firm; 2 = partially new to market; 3 = new to market (reference group: 'new to the firm') 
 Model 1: Model 2: 
Labor flexibility: Coefficient (t-value) Coefficient (t-value) 
External labor turnover (max) -0.010 (-0.12) - 
Percentage of workers on temporary contract -0.038 (-1.69)† -0.042 (-2.01) * 
Functional (internal) flexibility 0.010 (0.57) 0.010 (0.56) 
Control variables:   
Export intensity -0.004 (-0.70) -0.003 (-0.50) 
Firm age 0.003 (0.43) 0.003 (0.46) 
R&D intensity (product or service-related R&D) 0.018 (1.66) † 0.018 (1.71) † 
Firm size 0.000 (0.02) -0.000 (-0.04) 
Industry average new product sales 0.594 (1.84) † 0.604 (1.89) † 
Cut1 
Cut2 
Number of observations 
5.539 
8.173 
150 
5.621 
8.260 
155 
Log likelihood -144.33 -149.08 
Pseudo R² 0.031 0.032 
Statistics summary Wald chi2(8)= 10.80 Wald chi2(8)= 11.09 
a The results are based on a cross-sectional OSA data; the dependent variable is taken from the 2001 survey 
(covering year 2000); the independent variables come from the 1999 survey, covering year 1998. 
b † : at 0.1 significance level; *: at 0.05 significance level; **: at 0.01 significance level; two-tailed test 
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5. Discussion and conclusions 
This paper makes an empirical contribution to the sparse knowledge about the im-
pact of flexible labor on innovation, using new product sales as a direct measure of inno-
vation and controlling for factors such as human capital, R&D intensity, export intensity, 
firm size and age, and industry average new product sales. As opposed to some previous 
studies, our data allow a 2-year lag between the dependent and independent variables, 
which we hope will relax the problems of endogeneity that are notorious in this type of 
analysis. Not surprisingly, R&D intensity, export intensity and levels of education and 
training all contribute positively to new product sales. As expected, an individual firm's 
new product sales are heavily related to average sales in its sector of principal activity. 
We find weak evidence that larger and older firms have higher new product sales 
than their young and small counterparts. It seems as if the (dis)-advantages of a firm be-
ing small or big or being old or young almost cancel each other out. This is hard to recon-
cile with evidence reported earlier by Acs and Audretsch (1993) using new product an-
nouncement data. They found that, in many sectors, smaller firms made a disproportio-
nately large contribution to innovative output. Investigating new product announcement 
data more thoroughly, however, evidence has been found indicating that the data are 
biased in favor of smaller firms (see van der Panne, 2004). The output indicator used in 
this paper does not seem to have such a bias (Kleinknecht et al., 2002). We conclude that 
the advantages typical of small and young firms, such as little bureaucracy and short 
communication lines, dedicated management by the owners or the ability to occupy mar-
ket niches that are less interesting for big firms, seem to be compensated (or perhaps 
slightly over-compensated) by the advantages enjoyed by bigger and older firms, such as 
the ease of financing of innovations due to some monopoly power, the exploitation of 
strong marketing functions and brand names, accumulated knowledge and experience 
from (the management of) earlier innovations, or the diversification of risks through a 
large portfolio of innovation projects. 
The positive impact of functional flexibility is significant in all four models of both 
samples and is consistent with previous results by Michie and Sheehan (1999, 2001); 
Chadwick and Cappelli (2002) and Arvanitis (2005). Our findings confirm the important 
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role of functional flexibility in reducing barriers to knowledge sharing and building mul-
tiple competencies of employees in internal labor markets. Functional flexibility in “insi-
der-outsider” labor markets allows for flexibility while being socially responsible towards 
a firm's personnel. The latter might be interpreted as an investment in trust, loyalty and 
commitment. Such investment is likely to economize on supervision and monitoring costs 
and reduces the leaking of a firm's knowledge to competitors. 
Our model is remarkably robust to changes in specifications and in sample size. 
This also holds for inclusion of non-linear terms of numerical flexibility variables. Speci-
fications with non-linear terms are not documented in this paper, as these terms all proved 
insignificant. Intuitively, one might have expected that there is some optimum level of 
numerical flexibility that would enhance innovation and that beyond the optimum point, 
flexibility becomes counter-productive. However, the data do not support this. 
We find mixed results on numerical flexibility. While one of the proxies of numeri-
cal flexibility, external labor turnover, is insignificant in all four models, another proxy, 
temporary work, has a positive effect on innovation performance, or, being more precise, 
on “imitative” (“new to the firm”) products. As could be seen from Table 3-1, most of 
our new product introducers are market followers rather than market leaders, i.e., they in-
troduce products that are “new to the firm” rather than products “new to the market.” 
Many of these firms are likely similar to what Pavitt (1984) named “supplier-dominated 
innovators,” i.e., firms that innovate mainly by adopting (and creatively using) new 
equipment from suppliers. Such adoption may be favored by carefully screening the right 
personnel. As we saw from Table 4-2, an important motive behind using temporary con-
tracts is personnel screening. Typically, young university graduates are hired under a pro-
bationary period and can expect tenure if they perform well. Such temporary contracts 
seem to be positively related to “imitative” innovations. 
Further explorations suggest, however, that the probability of having products “new 
to the market” (rather than “new to the firm”) is negatively influenced by high shares of 
temporary workers. Hence, the minority of R&D intensive market leaders tends to rely 
significantly less on flexible work, which is consistent with the findings of Arvanitis’ 
(2005) study on data from Switzerland. It also underlines the arguments by Lucidi and 
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Kleinknecht (2009) about the need for the continuous accumulation of (tacit) knowledge 
that is favored by longer commitments of workers to their firms. It appears that the much 
criticized “rigidity” of insider-outsider labor markets is favorable to R&D intensive mar-
ket leaders, while the larger stream of imitators and market followers prefer using tempo-
rary contracts to try out new people with fresh ideas, which may favor technology adop-
tion. 
Finally, our results warn against the unconditional plea by mainstream economists 
for the deregulation of labor markets (see e.g. the OECD's Job Study, 1994). It seems that 
the “rigidity” of insider-outsider labor markets also has advantages, as it allows for “func-
tional” flexibility. The often criticized protection of “insiders” can be interpreted as an in-
vestment in the loyalty and commitment of workers. Moreover, functional flexibility on 
internal labor markets has advantages for the continuity of (organizational) learning, and 
strengthens the historical memory of firms. Neoclassical economists should note that 
temporary contracts might have advantages for imitative firms, but definitely are not an 
option preferred by market leaders who seem to have a greater need for continuity in lear-
ning and in preventing knowledge from leaking to competitors. 
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Appendix A: Overview of firms that participated in each wave (1991-2005)a 
Year of first wave 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 
1989 2041b 1391 985 676 467 292 131 72 36 
1991  626 404 297 194 120 38 26 17 
1993   653 407 252 152 69 38 25 
1995    1316 797 450 192 96 50 
1997     825 438 172 96 52 
1999      1273 551 282 120 
2001       2046 986 446 
2003        3152 1186 
2005         1199 
Total 2041 2017 2042 2696 2537 2725 3199 4748 3131 
a Source: OSA Labour Demand Panel (Explanatory notes) 1991-2006 
b Italics: Numbers of newly participating firms 
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Appendix B: Description of variables 
Variable names: Variables description: 
Dependent variable: 
Log (new product sales per 
employee) 
The logarithm of turnover from new products 'new to the firm 
and/or 'new to the market' introduced during the past two years 
divided by total employees. Note that 'imitative' innovations ('new 
to the firm' but already known in the market) are much more 
numerous than innovations 'new to the market'. In fact, we measure 
imitation rather than innovation. 
Variables on flexible labor: 
External flexibility Maximum of the share of newly hired employees and the share of 
employees that left the firm during the last year. 
Temporary work The percentage of employees having fixed-term contracts hired 
directly by the firm. 
Functional flexibility The percentage of employees that changed their function and/or 
department within the firm. 
Control variables: 
Qualified personnel The percentage of employees with university or higher professional 
education degrees. 
Training The percentage of employees that participated in training (both 
internal and external trainings). 
Export Export as the share of turnover. 
R&D intensity R&D expenditure on new products or services as a percentage share 
of turnover 
Firm age Difference between survey year and establishment year 
Firm size Number of employees in full-time equivalents 
Industry average new 
product sales 
Average of logs of new product sales per employee in a firm's 
sector of principal activity. 
Instrumental variable 
Economic fluctuations Categorical variable: Whether the firm is sensitive to fluctuations in 
the economy; 1=not sensitive, 2= a little bit sensitive, 3=very 
sensitive. 
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Appendix C: Descriptive statistics (Total sample vs. SME sample) 
Variable name Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent variable      
Log (new product sales per employee) 5.88 
(6.71) 
7.86 
(10.00) 
5.32 
(5.62) 
0 
(0) 
25.52 
(19.80) 
Variables on flexible labor      
External labor turnover 14.18 
(14.96) 
10.71 
(10.73) 
19.79 
(20.10) 
0 
(0) 
1111 
(500) 
Personnel on temporary contract 4.37 
(3.94) 
0 
(0) 
9.76 
(8.29) 
0 
(0) 
100 
(100) 
Functional flexibility 2.88 
(2.72) 
0 
(0) 
6.54 
(5.83) 
0 
(0) 
117 
(75) 
Control variables      
Qualified personnel 23.22 
(13.90) 
10.53 
(7.12) 
28.57 
(19.20) 
0 
(0) 
100 
(100) 
Training 35.51 
(31.35) 
26.91 
(24.15) 
27.88 
(24.35) 
0.3 
(0) 
100 
(100) 
Export 8.25 
(14.36) 
0 
(0) 
22.09 
(27.22) 
0 
(0) 
100 
(100) 
R&D intensity 8.31 
(9.67) 
0 
(0) 
13.17 
(13.69) 
0 
(0) 
30 
(30) 
Firm age 27.04 
(26.55) 
17 
(18) 
27.77 
(26.09) 
0 
(0) 
99 
(103) 
Firm size 205.05 
(63.21) 
51 
(39) 
540.36 
(60.37) 
5 
(5) 
23500 
(250) 
Industry average new product sales 9.59 
(9.41) 
10.49 
(10.84) 
2.64 
(2.99) 
1.74 
(1.74) 
13 
(13) 
Instrumental variable      
Economic fluctuation 1.94 
(0.24) 
2 
(2) 
0.78 
(0.72) 
1 
(1) 
3 
(3) 
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Appendix D: Correlations between variables (total sample) 
 Variable name 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 VIFs 
1 Log (new product sales 
per employee) 
            
2 External labor turnover 0.01           1.19 
3 Temporary work 0.01 0.15*          1.17 
4 Functional flexibility 0.11* 0.11* 0.05*         1.13 
5 Qualified personnel 0.13* -0.03* 0.13* 0.03*        1.16 
6 Training 0.10* 0.01 0.03* 0.07* 0.19*       1.07 
7 Export 0.14* -0.02 -0.02* 0.05* -0.12* -0.09*      1.12 
8 R&D intensity 0.17* 0.03* 0.02* 0.08* 0.03* -0.06* 0.23*     1.20 
9 Firm age -0.07* -0.07* -0.01 -0.02 -0.06* -0.06* 0.06* 0.04*    1.02 
10 Firm size 0.10* -0.01 -0.01 0.19* 0.02 -0.06* 0.02* 0.06* 0.04*   1.07 
11 Industry average new 
product sales 
-0.02 0.08* -0.02* 0.05* -0.06* 0.14* 0.04* 0.05* -0.02* 0.00  1.03 
12 Economic fluctuation 0.02 0.03* -0.03* 0.00 -0.22* -0.07* 0.14* 0.10* 0.03* -0.04* 0.02*  
* p<0.05, two-tailed tests 
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Appendix E: Correlations between variables (SME sample) 
 Variable name 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 VIFs 
1 Log (new product sales 
per employee) 
            
2 External labor turnover 0.06           1.21 
3 Temporary work 0.12* 0.27*          1.20 
4 Functional flexibility 0.14* 0.23* 0.11*         1.10 
5 Qualified personnel 0.15* 0.10* 0.15* 0.12*        1.13 
6 Training 0.11* 0.01 0.03 0.08* 0.16*       1.06 
7 Export 0.16* -0.03 0.01 0.08* 0.01 -0.07*      1.19 
8 R&D intensity 0.24* 0.02 0.07* 0.09* 0.16* -0.01 0.25*     1.18 
9 Firm age 0.05 -0.10* -0.00 -0.02 -0.04 0.06* 0.00 -0.01    1.06 
10 Firm size 0.13* -0.07* 0.09* 0.11* 0.05* -0.01 0.26* 0.20* 0.16*   1.19 
11 Industry average new 
product sales 
-0.06 0.06* 0.05* 0.06* 0.09* 0.13* 0.01 0.01 -0.00 -0.10*  1.03 
12 Economic fluctuation 0.04 0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.12* 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.05* -0.06*  
* p<0.05, two-tailed tests 
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1  Hall and Soskice (2001) suggested that rigid “Rhineland” arrangements are more conducive to 
incremental innovation, while flexible “Anglo-Saxon” contracts are better for radical innovation. This 
suggestion did, however, meet some criticism recently (see Akkermans et al., 2009). 
2 For evidence from the OSA database on the wage-reducing effects of flexible work, both at the firm and 
the individual levels see Kleinknecht et al. (2006). 
3 Kleinknecht et al. (2006) give evidence from individual-level as well as firm-level wage equations that 
flexible personnel earn lower hourly wages, and that firms with high shares of flexible personnel pay lower 
wages. Similar evidence from individual-level wage equations has been reported by Booth et al., 2002, 
McGinnity and Mertens 2004; Sànchez and Toharia 2000, or Ségal and Sullivan, 1995. 
Publications in the ERIM Report Series Research∗
 
 in Management 
ERIM Research Program: “Organizing for Performance” 
 
2010 
 
Investigating the Perceptions of Credit Constraints in the European Union 
Erik Canton, Isabel Grilo, Josefa Monteagudo, and Peter van der Zwan 
ERS-2010-001-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/17699  
 
Two Lighthouses to Navigate: Effects of Ideal and Counter-Ideal Values on Follower Identification and Satisfaction with their 
Leaders 
Niels van Quaquebeke, Rudolf Kerschreiter, Alice E. Buxton, and Rolf van Dick 
ERS-2010-003-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/17702  
 
Genome-wide Association Studies and the Genetics of Entrepreneurship 
Matthijs J.H.M. van der Loos, Philipp D. Koellinger, Patrick J.F. Groenen, and A. Roy Thurik 
ERS-2010-004-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/17757  
 
How embodied cognitions affect judgments: Height-related attribution bias in football foul calls 
Niels van Quaquebeke and Steffen R. Giessner 
ERS-2010-006-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/17827  
 
Flexible Labor and Innovation Performance: Evidence from Longitudinal Firm-Level Data 
Haibo Zhou, Ronald Dekker, and Alfred Kleinknecht 
ERS-2010-007-ORG 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/18037  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
∗ A complete overview of the ERIM Report Series Research in Management: 
https://ep.eur.nl/handle/1765/1 
 
 ERIM Research Programs: 
 LIS Business Processes, Logistics and Information Systems 
 ORG Organizing for Performance 
 MKT Marketing  
 F&A Finance and Accounting 
 STR Strategy and Entrepreneurship  
